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PROFESSIONAL CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION IN 
MEDICINE WITH ATTENTION TO REFERRAL 
T.A. Cavanaugh† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
At the University of Notre Dame’s 2009 commencement, President 
Obama proposed to “honor the conscience of those who disagree with 
abortion and draft a sensible conscience clause, and make sure that all 
of our health care policies are grounded not only in sound science but 
also in clear ethics as well as respect for the equality of women.”1  
This paper takes up the President’s suggestion by addressing con-
scientious objection in medicine.  In what follows, this paper presents 
the principal features of a sensible clause while elaborating upon the 
need to extend conscientious objection to include referral, a particularly 
controverted claim. 
What is a sensible conscience clause?  First, one needs to distinguish 
professional conscientious objection in medicine from conscientious 
objection in employment more generally.  The former concerns those 
who have publicly, or pro fateri, said what they stand for: profess-
ionals.2  They have articulated and publicly stated an account of med-
ical care that delimits what they take to be within and without the 
practice to which they commit themselves.  Most importantly, this 
 
 †   I gratefully acknowledge the very helpful comments of the participants at the BYU 
Law School’s February 2010 Symposium on the Future of Rights of Conscience in Health Care.  I 
thank BYU Law School and University Faculty for Life for sponsoring the Symposium.  I par-
ticularly thank Professors Richard Myers and Lynn Wardle (the latter’s hospitality while at BYU 
set an insuperable standard for all future conferences).  I express gratitude to Professor Guy 
Micco, M.D. of U.C. Berkeley’s School of Public Health for reading and commenting upon earlier 
versions of this article.  I also thank participants in UFL’s 2009 Life and Learning Conference 
who helpfully responded to an earlier version of this paper.  I remain entirely responsible for 
its deficiencies. 
 1.  President Barack Obama, Commencement Address at the University of Notre Dame 
(May 17, 2009), in 39 ORIGINS 33, 36 (2009). 
 2.  See Hugh Walters, The Meaning of Words in the New Health Service, 88 J.  ROYAL 
SOC’Y MED.  365, 366 (1995) (“The word profession comes from the Latin pro fateri which means 
‘to bear witness on behalf of . . .’ .” (ellipses in original)). 
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account includes their conceptions of themselves as medical practi-
tioners and what constitutes a patient, a disease, health, and medical 
therapy.  Physicians, nurses, and pharmacists are medical profess-
ionals; ultrasound, radiology, and surgical technicians are not.  A 
sensible medical conscience clause bears on the former.  Conscientious 
objection in employment more generally would address the latter, 
just as it would address the issue of, for example, Islamic taxi dri-
vers’ religiously-based objections to transporting passengers carrying 
alcohol.3  Thus, what follows concerns professional conscientious 
objection in medicine. 
This account understands a profession to have an independent 
character autonomous from what law permits and society accepts.  
While there is pluralism within professions concerning particulars, 
and, therefore, disputes within the professions concerning their self-
conceptions, a profession and professionals, as such, always stand for 
something more than the efficient use of skill.  Put most generally, 
this something more amounts to their view of the good they seek and 
the bad they avoid, or, their ethic.  With this distinction in mind, and 
noting that conscientious objection bears on otherwise legal patient 
requests, the following outlines a conscience clause for medical pro-
fessionals.  After delineating conscientious objection, this Article will 
present the obligations attending it. 
 
 3.  In Minneapolis, Minn., approximately two-thirds of cab drivers are Islamic Somalis.  
According to certain Muslim clerics influential in Minneapolis, the Koran’s prohibition against 
drinking alcohol extends to transporting alcohol.  While other clerics dispute this interpretation, 
some Muslim cab drivers at the Minneapolis airport refused to transport passengers openly 
carrying alcohol from the duty-free airport stores.  Stephanie Simon, Where Faith and Work 
Collide, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2007, at A10.  In April of 2007, the Minnesota Airports Commissioners 
decided that a taxi driver must transport passengers with alcohol.  Dolal v. Metro. Airports 
Comm’n, No. 07-1657 slip op. at 4 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 9, 2008).  Now if a driver were to refuse 
a fare on any grounds, his work license is to be suspended for thirty days; a subsequent refusal 
is to result in a two-year suspension.  MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., METROPOLITAN AIRPORTS 
COMMISSION, ORDINANCE 106 § 3.1 (2007).  The policy was appealed to the Minnesota Court of 
Appeals, which in September of 2008 ratified a lower court’s ruling that it was legitimate 
because the taxi drivers did not suffer irreparable harm.  Dolal, No. 07-1657, at 7– 8.  Although 
not the topic of this paper, this seems like an unenlightened, unimaginative resolution of the 
dispute.  Given that there were typically more taxis than customers at the airport and that 
problems arose fewer than a dozen times a month, a variety of resolutions presented themselves, 
including having non-objecting drivers jump the taxi-line when an objection arose.  Id. at 3–4.  
This, in conjunction with a policy that once a driver takes a fare he must bring the fare to her 
destination, would have resolved the conflict.  Id.   
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II. GENERAL FEATURES OF A SENSIBLE CONSCIENCE CLAUSE 
First, the professional objects based upon her professed account of 
medicine.  Her account is public, promulgated, graspable by others, 
and scientifically-grounded.  The objector must be capable of giving 
reasons accessible to others, in contrast to asserting an entirely personal 
stance.  These reasons must refer to empirically grounded concepts of 
health, disease, the subject of both (the patient), the goals of medicine, 
its capabilities, and its boundaries.  So, for example, an obstetrician 
who objects to circumcising a healthy newborn male may do so based 
upon his account of bodily integrity and the proper functioning of 
organs.  For similar reasons, a nurse may object to being involved in a 
sterilization post-caesarian section.  A pharmacist in Oregon or Wash-
ington might object to a terminally ill cancer patient’s legal request to 
fill a lethal prescription for physician-assisted suicide in terms of life 
not itself being a disease.  An anesthesiologist might object to her 
participation in capital punishment by reference to her account of the 
very concept of a patient and of sickness.  In doing so, each of these 
professionals offers a reason-based explanation available to others for 
objecting to the relevant request.  Professionals offer such explanations 
not in terms of exclusively personal beliefs, but rather, in terms of 
accessible, albeit controverted, answers to the central questions of 
medical practice.  Those questions include: What is medicine?  What 
is a patient?  What is a disease?  What is health?  And what goals can 
and ought medicine to serve?4 
Because a sensible conscience clause must be grounded in a 
professed account of medicine, it does not cover, for example, 
objecting to relieving a patient’s pain based on one’s religious belief in 
pain’s redemptive value or one’s experiential belief that pain builds 
character.  It does not extend to an obstetrician who considers anes-
thesia during labor objectionable based upon his religious conviction 
that Genesis 3:16 5 requires that labor be redemptively painful.  Nor 
does it encompass the profane belief in pain as character-building.  
Sensible objection requires that one’s grounds be both reason-based 
 
 4.  Sixty years ago, practitioners widely shared a profession of medicine roughly 
corresponding to the Hippocratic ethic.  Today, one finds numerous oaths, and, by implication, 
professions.  For a study of the variety amongst oaths in all accredited U.S. allopathic and 
osteopathic medical schools as of 2000, see Audiey C. Kao & Kayhan P. Parsi, Content Analyses 
of Oaths Administered at U.S. Medical Schools in 2000, 79 ACAD. MED. 882, 882–86 (2004).   
 5.  Genesis 3:16 (Revised Standard, Catholic Edition) (“[I]n pain you shall bring forth 
children.”). 
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and medical.  A religious belief in the redemptive value of pain is 
neither reason-based nor medical.  Alternatively, a belief in pain as 
character-building may be reason-based, but not medical.  Thus, such 
nonmedical, non-reason-based convictions do not ground professional 
conscientious objection. 
The exclusion of profane, nonmedical-based convictions does not 
significantly depart from current statutes concerning conscientious 
objection in medicine.  However, ruling out exclusively religious 
convictions importantly differs from current federal conscientious 
objection statutes, which explicitly mention religious beliefs as a 
basis for conscientious objection.6  Accordingly, it requires comment.  A 
sensible conscience clause for medical professionals does not extend to 
every instance of conscientious objection that society may be willing 
to grant to individuals.  As noted, an employee may have a claim to 
conscientious objection in employment just as a citizen may have one 
to military-service or other forms of governmental-mandated action.7  
These claims may be grounded in religion.  These rights of objection 
extend to the employee as an employee in the context of employment, 
or to the citizen as a citizen in the context of citizenship.  So also, the 
professional has rights to conscientious objection in the context of 
profession, which may materially differ from those of the employee 
and those of the citizen.  Most significantly, the professional’s actual 
profession (her view of health, sickness, patients, and the purposes of 
medicine) grounds professional conscientious objection. 
As professions, medicine, law, and the clergy possess autonomy, 
literally of a self-lawed character.  For example, the legal and clerical 
professions enjoy a virtually absolute degree of confidentiality not 
found elsewhere in social relations.8  Professional conscientious ob-
jection in medicine is an instance of the autonomy of the professions 
from what is simply legal.9  Professional conscientious objection differs 
from religiously grounded objection by being reason-based, and there-
 
 6.  See Health Programs Extension (The Church Amendment) Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C.          
§ 300a-7 (2006) (referring to “religious beliefs or moral convictions”). 
 7.  See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ., 319 U.S. 624, 628–630 (1943); Newdow v. Rio Linda 
Union Sch. Dist., 597 F.3d 1007, 1014 (9th Cir. 2010) (both cases discussing requirement that U.S. 
school children salute or pledge allegiance to the American flag). 
 8.  In this respect, the defeasible confidentiality in medicine differs from its counterparts 
in law and religion, thus indicating differences within the professions. 
 9.  From the legality of an intervention, one may not conclude that a professional must 
acquiesce to a patient’s request for the intervention.  The criteria, in terms of which one 
determines legality, have little to no bearing on the practitioner’s profession concerning health, 
sickness, and the ends of medicine.   
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fore, in principle, accessible to all.  To highlight exclusively religiously- 
based conscientious objection to the neglect of professional con-
scientious objection renders conscientious objection a strange and 
alien phenomenon to the nonreligious.  More importantly, to do so 
erroneously suggests that the professional has no positions concerning 
the ethics of her own practice.  The venerable Hippocratic Oath indi-
cates otherwise.10  Regardless of one’s judgment concerning the Oath, 
it points to a 2,400-year-old autonomous profession, as does profess-
ional conscientious objection more generally.  Accordingly, we must 
distinguish professional from religious conscientious objection. 
Because the professed account of medicine must be empirically 
grounded, new information and technological changes influence it.  It 
is scientifically grounded, not ideologically based.  Accordingly, unlike 
ideology, discoveries can change it.  For example, to consider one 
currently debated issue of conscience, some find emergency contra-
ception (sometimes known as EC, the “morning after pill,” or by its 
trade name Levonorgestrel11) morally problematic.12  They do so 
because they believe it to have at least two mechanisms of operation 
by which it prevents pregnancy: First, a contraceptive agency by 
which it prevents ovulation and, thereby, fertilization of an ovum, 
and second, an abortifacient mechanism by which it prevents the 
fertilized ovum from implanting in the uterus.  All acknowledge the 
contraceptive mechanism.  Dispute and some ambiguity attend the 
second, putatively abortifacient mechanism.13  If it were to be established 
that the currently favored emergency contraception, Levonorgestrel, 
had no abortifacient mechanism, or if an alternative pill were devel-
oped that acted solely as a contraceptive, then one who finds abortion 
professionally objectionable—while not objecting to contraception—
could with a clear conscience prescribe, fill, or administer it.  Whatever 
the case concerning this example, professional conscientious objection 
must be evidence-based. 
 
 10.  “I will neither give a deadly drug to anybody if asked for it, nor will I make a 
suggestion to this effect.”  HIPPOCRATES, THE HIPPOCRATIC OATH (c. 400 B.C.), in ANCIENT 
MEDICINE: SELECTED PAPERS OF LUDWIG EDELSTEIN 6 (Owsei Temkin & C. Lilian Temkin eds., 
Ludwig Edelstein trans. 1987).  
 11. Frequently Asked Questions, PLAN B ONE-STEP, http://www.planbonestep.com/plan-
b-faq.aspx (last visited Feb. 7, 2011). 
 12.  See Peter J. Cataldo, The USCCB and Rape Protocols, 29 ETHICS & MEDICS 2 (2004), 
reprinted in 72 LINACRE Q. 255, 255–58 (2005). 
 13.  J.B. Stanford, Emergency Contraception: Overestimated Effectiveness and Questionable 
Expectations, 83 CLINICAL PHARM. & THERAPEUTICS 19, 20 (2008). 
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This brings us to the second feature of the clause, which addresses 
a particularly difficult issue in determining the outlines of sensible 
conscientious objection.  Namely, may objection refer to specifics about 
the patient or must it refer solely to a requested intervention?14  
While there may be legitimate instances in which a professional 
objects to performing some intervention based upon characteristics of 
the patient —for example, a physician might prescribe contraceptives 
while objecting to doing so for minors—such cases ought to be 
regarded as exceptions to a general rule which focuses on objection to 
specific interventions.  Generally, the professional ought to object to a 
requested intervention, not to the requestor.  So, for example, if a 
fertility doctor does not object to in vitro fertilization in terms of his 
account of medical practice, he ought to provide it to all otherwise 
medically-qualified patients.15  Generally, objection ought not employ 
any nonmedical reference to the patient who makes the request.16  Ra-
 
 14.  This question resembles one encountered in discussions of conscientious objection to 
military service.  Namely, to be granted conscientious objector status, must an individual object 
to all wars—be a thoroughgoing pacifist—or may he accept the justice of some wars while 
objecting to the justice of others—be a subscriber to just war theory, also called selective 
conscientious objection?  Clearly, it is easier for society to administer the pacifist/non-pacifist 
distinction (object to all wars/not object to all wars) than to extend conscientious objector status 
to adherents of the just war theory (some wars are just while others are not).  Indeed, the U.S.  
Department of Defense policy, and apparently, U.S. law do not accept selective conscientious 
objection.  “An individual who desires to choose the war in which he or she will participate is 
not a Conscientious Objector under the law.  The individual’s objection must be to all wars 
rather than a specific war.”  DEP’T OF DEFENSE, INSTRUCTION NUMBER 1300.06, CONSCIENTIOUS 
OBJECTORS § 3.5.1 (2007), available at  http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/ i1300_06.pdf. 
 15.  See, e.g., N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Group, Inc., v. San Diego Cnty. Superior Court, 
189 P.3d 959, (Cal. 2008).  A lesbian woman had sought and received fertility treatment.  Id. at 
963.  While her doctors had no objections to prescribing medication to facilitate fertility nor to 
referring her to a non-objecting physician, the doctors did object to performing intrauterine 
insemination [hereinafter IUI].  Id.  There was a factual dispute between the parties that was 
never settled at court:  The plaintiff asserted that the physicians objected to performing IUI in 
light of her sexual orientation; the doctors claimed to object to inseminating a single woman.  Id. 
at 969–70.  In effect, the court ruled that the basis upon which the physicians did not provide 
the service was not relevant.  Id. at 970.  Their objection had the effect of discrimination based on 
sexual orientation, regardless of their motive for objection.  Id.  The court held that while one 
need not provide the relevant service, if one does offer it, it must be provided to all:  “[D]efendant 
physicians can simply refuse to perform the IUI medical procedure at issue here for any patient 
of North Coast, the physicians’ employer.  Or, . . . defendant physicians can avoid such a conflict 
by ensuring that every patient requiring IUI receives ‘full and equal’ access to that medical 
procedure though [sic] a North Coast physician lacking defendants’ religious objections.”  Id.  at 
968–69 (quoting Unruh Civil Rights Act, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 51(a), (b), 52(a) (2009)). 
 16.  The medical versus nonmedical distinction is not an entirely bright one (and the 
above-mentioned “medically-qualified patient” does not remain free of ambiguity).  Many 
would think it perfectly legitimate, perhaps even obligatory, for a fertility specialist to object to 
providing interventions for a woman well past child-bearing age or to a woman based upon the 
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ther, it solely considers the act requested.  Medicine bandages the 
wounds of the wounded, regardless of creed, character, race, gender, 
sexual orientation, innocence, or guilt.  Similarly, conscientious ob-
jection generally excludes scrutiny of the patient to whose request 
the doctor objects.17 
Third, conscientious objection extends from individuals to in-
stitutions.  For institutions organically arise out of the association of 
individuals who often share a professed account of medicine.  As 
Thoreau notes, “It is truly enough said, that a corporation has no 
conscience; but a corporation of conscientious men is a corporation 
with a conscience.”18  To prohibit the extension of conscientious ob-
jection to corporations or institutions is to thereby prohibit citizens 
from associating conscientiously.  So, just as a pharmacist may object 
to filling a prescription for physician-assisted suicide, so also may a 
pharmacy.  Indeed, in the case of small pharmacies, the pharmacy is 
often the pharmacist. 
Fourth, and this point closely follows upon that just made, the 
extension of conscientious objection to individuals in principle 
amounts to an extension of conscientious objection to the entire 
profession.  For one professional after another may legitimately ex-
ercise conscientious objection to include the entire membership of the 
profession.  Simply because the law endorses the use of a medical 
technology does not insure, and more importantly—given the pro-
fession’s autonomy from the law—ought it to insure that medical 
professionals themselves agree with that use of their abilities. 
This will understandably be a much-controverted claim, especially 
given concerns about access to interventions in rural areas where one 
typically finds fewer practitioners.  Moreover, as some note, given 
 
number of children she already has.  In such cases, medical and nonmedical considerations 
overlap.  To take a more controversial case, consider a fertility specialist who limits his practice 
to married heterosexual couples in light of his medical view that they alone suffer infertility.  
Such a professional might reasonably maintain that he treats reproductive systems, which 
systems are neither male nor female, but rather, the union of a male and a female.  If he were 
conscientiously to object to treating a single woman (or man), he would not thereby be importing 
nonmedical reference to the patient.  For fertility, and thereby, infertility, are medical 
characteristics of heterosexual couples.  Again, while such cases might be justifiable and while 
society may be willing to accommodate them, they ought to be considered exceptions to the 
general rule in which one objects to performing a specific intervention, not to performing it for 
this patient. 
 17.  See, e.g., id. at 968–69; see also Wesley J. Smith, Pulling the Plug on the Conscience 
Clause, FIRST THINGS, Dec. 2009, at 41, 43. 
 18.  HENRY D. THOREAU, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE (1849), reprinted in ON CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE: 
AMERICAN ESSAYS, OLD AND NEW 11, 12–13 (Robert A. Goldwin ed., 3d prtg. 1973) (1968). 
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that the medical professions enjoy monopoly-like control over the 
controverted procedures and technologies, ought one grant con-
scientious objection to the profession itself, that is, allow conscientious 
objection in principle to extend to all members?19 
In light of this monopoly-like control some who would grant 
conscientious objection to individuals would deny it both to insti-
tutions and to the profession in its entirety.  However, as noted above, 
because professionals constitute a profession and individuals by 
association compose institutions, conscientious objection cannot be 
limited to individuals.  To do so disregards the individual’s associative 
nature, as Professor Lynn Wardle notes: “To exclude institutional 
health providers from conscience clause protection is merely an 
indirect way of denying the conscience and morality of the indi-
viduals whose will and purposes the entities were created to effect.”20  
Nonetheless, those who attend to the exclusive command the medical 
professions enjoy over the relevant matters have a point.  Medical 
professions and institutions cannot, on the one hand, exert sole 
control over technologies and, on the other, enjoy conscientious 
objection concerning those interventions that have been legalized.  
Thus, just as legislatures and voters may legalize the use of medical 
technologies in manners rejected by the medical profession,21 they 
may also legalize others to employ those interventions.  Indeed, the 
medical professions ought not to impede, and, as much as is con-
sistent with their professional ethic, ought to endorse nonmedical 
personnel being permitted to employ the relevant legalized tech-
nologies and interventions. 
Consider a case requiring physician- and nurse-complicity in 
capital punishment in the State of North Carolina.22  The Supreme 
Court of North Carolina recently ruled that the North Carolina Medical 
Board, which licenses physicians in the state, cannot restrict physician-
participation in capital punishment to the physician being phys-
ically present at an execution.23  Rather, in opposition to the Medical 
Board’s (on the face of things, principled and balanced) stance, the 
 
 19.  For a discussion on the issue of monopoly and its bearing on conscientious objection 
see Elizabeth Fenton & Loren Lomasky, Dispensing with Liberty: Conscientious Refusal and the 
“Morning-After Pill,”  30 J. MED. & PHIL. 579, 579–92 (2005). 
 20.  Lynn D. Wardle, Protecting the Rights of Conscience of Health Care Providers, 14 J. 
LEGAL MED. 177, 186 (1993). 
 21.  See, e.g., N.C. Dep’t of Corr. v. N.C. Med. Bd., 675 S.E.2d 641, 643–45 (N.C. 2009). 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. at 651. 
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legislature can, as it does in N.C.G.S. §§ 15-190, require that a 
physician, “monitor the essential body functions of the condemned 
inmate and [ ] notify the Warden immediately upon his or her 
determination that the inmate shows signs of undue pain or 
suffering.”24  It could come about that all physicians object to this 
participation in capital punishment (as it could develop that all 
nurses and pharmacists also object).  Indeed, in arriving at its stance, 
the Medical Board noted that, “physician participation in capital 
punishment is a departure from the ethics of the medical profession.”25  
Additionally, the Medical Board cited the American Medical 
Association’s Code of Medical Ethics opinion on capital punishment, 
which distinguishes the personal opinion of the medical practitioner 
concerning the morality of the death penalty from the ethic of “a 
member of a profession dedicated to preserving life when there is 
hope of doing so.”26  To protect conscientious objection and to insure 
accessibility to the legalized intervention, legislatures that mandate 
the use of medical technologies in capital punishment must extend 
authority over such techniques to nonmedical persons.  Thus, the 
State of North Carolina, for example, ought to revisit the exclusive 
control of medical professionals over the relevant technologies.  The 
same holds for other uses of putative medicine legislatures legalize.27  
Fifth, conscientious objection is a two-way street.  That is, con-
scientious objection protects both those who regard certain patient 
requests as objectionable and those who consider providing the re-
quested medical intervention to be legitimate or even required.  One 
finds this admirable feature in the Church Amendment of 1973, which 
prevents discrimination against both those who perform abortions 
and sterilizations and those who refuse to do so.28  A conscience clause 
 
 24.  Id. (alteration in original). 
 25.  Id. at 644. 
 26.  Id. at 645 (quoting AM. MED. ASS’N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS: CURRENT OPINIONS 
WITH ANNOTATION § 2.06: 20 (2008–2009 ed. 2008)). 
 27.  Id.  at 647 (“[E]xecutions are not medical procedures. . . .”).  The logic of the prevailing 
position being that, if executions are not medical procedures, then when the law requires 
medical doctors actively to participate in them, the medical board has no jurisdiction.  For, 
according to this line of thinking, the physicians do not act in a professional capacity.  What 
ought one make of such a tortuous and, thereby, torturous line of reasoning?  One possible 
implication would be that the Department of Corrections and a majority of justices of the N.C. 
Supreme Court recognize the autonomy of the medical profession in their very attempt to 
suborn it.  For our purposes, if a legislature wants to use medical expertise for a purpose 
medical professionals do not share, the legislature does well to make alternative provisions in 
light of that fact. 
 28.  See 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(c) (2006). 
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recognizes that there are competing professed accounts of medicine 
and controverted interventions.  As a two-way street, the conscience 
clause acknowledges the legitimacy of conscience at the level of 
institutions, while preventing institutions and individuals from discrim-
inating against those whose consciences differ.  So, for example, a 
Catholic hospital that objects to the performance of abortions or 
sterilizations on its premises may not deny privileges to an obstetrician 
who does so elsewhere.  Conscientious objection considers one’s own 
conduct, not that of another.  While a Catholic hospital might prefer to 
have unanimity on this controverted matter amongst those who 
practice within it, the hospital must extend to others the very 
protection afforded to it and to those practitioners sharing its account 
of medicine. 
Sixth, conscientious objection encompasses more than simply not 
performing the controverted intervention while in certain instances, 
requiring some cooperation with the patient in his attempt to 
achieve what he seeks.  Working out the boundaries of conscientious 
objection may be the most difficult task in reaching some political 
consensus concerning what a sensible conscience clause looks like.  
Most importantly, conscientious objection encompasses referrals.  
Because some would permit professionals to object to performing 
the controverted interventions while requiring referral, this merits 
greater consideration.29 
In order to discuss the extension of conscientious objection to 
referral, a number of distinctions are in order.  First, we must disting-
uish two cases: Namely, that of a patient with whom the professional 
has no preexisting relationship and that of the patient with whom 
there is a relationship prior to the controverted request.30  Second, we 
must distinguish the act of referral from what we may call full 
disclosure.  By full disclosure, I refer to the need to inform fully the 
patient of legally and medically available interventions.  In my 
consideration of the obligations attending conscientious objection, I 
will attend to the obligation of the objecting professional to discuss 
alternative options with the patient.  Referral and full disclosure differ.  
 
 29.  See, e.g., Adrienne Asch, Two Cheers for Conscience Exceptions, HASTINGS CTR. REP., 
Nov.–Dec. 2006, at 11, 12. 
 30.  As I employ the phrase, a preexisting relationship requires an encounter between 
professional and patient:  The more such encounters, the more significant the relationship and 
the greater the claims the patient has upon the physician.  Simply having an appointment or 
calling in a prescription to one rather than another pharmacy does not establish a preexisting 
relationship. 
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The objector need not refer, but he must disclose.  Putting this dis-
tinction aside for the moment, let us consider the issue of referral with 
respect to the two aforementioned cases. 
Before considering these two cases, a prior question arises:  Why 
regard referral as at all objectionable?  Given that professionals refer 
for those interventions they do not perform, it is, at least on the face of 
things, natural to suppose that an objecting professional would refer.  
For, just as the internist refers ingrown toenails to a podiatrist, so also 
would the objecting practitioner refer for physician-assisted suicide.  
Moreover, the internist would refer in both cases for the same reason; 
namely, because he does not perform the requested procedure.  This 
understandable, yet ultimately mistaken, view proposes that referral 
ought to occur if one does not perform the relevant act, regardless of 
the basis for not doing that act.  This view fails to note, however, that 
by referring one endorses the relevant act.  The internist referring to 
the podiatrist thereby approves of and, indeed, recommends the 
podiatrist’s act to the patient.  In the case of objection, since the pro-
fessional does not consider the relevant request to be consonant with 
his own professed account of health, sickness, and the ends, cap-
abilities, and limits of medicine, he could not consistently refer the 
patient to another.  To do so would be to contradict one’s very ob-
jection to the request in the first place.  A professional ethic cannot 
coherently regard some act as out of bounds while referring to 
another professional for the performance of that act.  While a patient 
might be gratified by an objecting professional’s referral, he would 
rightly be puzzled by such a view of an ethical principle.  For those 
who apprehend the concept of a restrictive ethical principle under-
stand it as prohibiting both one’s own act and one’s promotion of 
another’s so acting.31  Thus, from the very nature of allegiance to an 
ethical principle, conscientious objection extends to referral.32  In light 
 
 31.  For a comparable view, see Michael D. Bayles, A Problem of Clean Hands: Refusal to 
Provide Professional Services, 5 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 165, 165–81 (1979).  Bayles notes, “The 
argument against referring . . . appears consequentialist. . . .  The consequentialism involved is 
inescapable in morality, for it is the ‘consequentialism’ of claiming that it is better that wrongful 
conduct not occur, that one ought not to assist in it . . . .  The arguments are drawn from the 
inescapable consequentialism of having moral principles.”  Id.  at 168. 
 32.  Notably, this is one of the ways in which an ethical principle can differ from a religious 
obligation.  Consider a few religious observations.  For example, on certain days, practicing 
Catholics do not eat meat.  Yet this religious duty does not prevent them from selling, pro-
viding, preparing, recommending, and in general promoting the eating of meat by others who 
do not share their religion.  Similarly, on the Sabbath, observant Jews refrain from certain 
activities.  This religious commitment does not prevent them, however, from accepting the 
performance of such acts on their behalf by a volunteer who does not share their beliefs.  So, for 
AMLR.V9I1.CAVANAUGH.FINAL 2/16/2011  6:28 PM 
200 AVE MARIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:1 
of this, return to the two above-mentioned cases.  For the extension of 
conscientious objection to referral in the two cases differs.  If no pre-
existing relationship exists, the professional need not refer for the 
reasons noted above.  However, if the professional has a preexisting 
relationship, he does have an obligation to insure that his patients are 
aware of his stance.  If he has failed in this respect and an existing 
patient reasonably assumes him to be willing, the professional has 
an obligation to refer if the patient so insists.33  For, absent notification 
to the contrary, the patient has the reasonable belief that the 
professional will perform or refer for the requested act.  Moreover, the 
patient has justifiably developed reliance upon the professional.  
Were the professional not to refer, he would thereby violate the 
patient’s honest dependence to which he contributed by not ad-
equately communicating his objection.  Accordingly, as will be noted 
subsequently, professionals must scrupulously inform relevant parties 
of their positions lest they create obligations based upon others’ 
reasonable reliance upon them.34  With the above exception in mind, 
an objector need not refer. 
While in the noted cases, conscientious objection encompasses 
referral, it does not extend to nonprofessional, logistical tasks such as 
the forwarding of medical records, or the return of a prescription 
from a pharmacy.35  In an instance of conscientious objection, but for 
the loss of time and the opportunity costs, the patient emerges no 
worse off from the interaction with the objecting professional.36  
 
example, while an observant Jew may not carry bottled water on a hike on the Sabbath, others 
may offer to do so for him. 
 33.  Here, patients may correctly assume that medical professionals legally can and do 
provide an intervention they desire.  Thus, an objecting professional has an obligation to inform 
his patients of his conscientious objector status, lest they develop reasonable reliance upon him.   
 34.  Some might point this out as inconsistent with the previous argument that objection 
encompasses referral.  In the envisioned case, the professional has gotten herself into a moral 
dilemma where she will either violate her conscience by referring or violate her obligation to the 
patient who has reasonably come to rely upon her.  In either case, whatever she does will be 
ethically problematic.  By promulgating her stance to relevant parties, she can avoid this 
dilemma.  Others might object that referral when a preexisting relationship exists does not 
adequately satisfy the obligations created by reliance.  In such cases, if competent, ought not the 
professional perform the relevant intervention?  The answer to this question depends upon 
particulars of the case such as how much of a burden referral poses to the patient, the elective 
character of the intervention, and how grave a violation of her profession does the physician 
regard the requested intervention in comparison to the wrong of reneging on her patient’s reliance. 
 35.  Absent reliance, however, and for reasons comparable to those already noted concern-
ing referral, a pharmacist need not call another pharmacy and communicate the contents of a 
prescription. 
 36. Of course, the patient incurs no charges for the refusal. 
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Yet, some who have recourse to conscientious objection might 
object:  Is not to acquiesce in the forwarding of medical records, the 
release of prescriptions, and fully to disclose legal and medically-
accepted options provided by other practitioners tantamount to a 
referral or to moral complicity in the satisfaction of the requested 
intervention?  By so limiting conscientious objection has one given 
with one hand and taken away with the other?  No.  Performing an 
intervention, referring a patient to another to do the same, filling a 
prescription, or communicating the contents of the same to another 
so that it may be filled intimately involves one in the relevant matter.  
One thereby acts with the purpose of ensuring the performance of the 
act.  The achievement of the disputed goal shapes and informs one’s 
own act.  Accordingly, one thereby becomes an accomplice to the act 
to which one objects.  For example, a referral must be to another 
capable and willing to fulfill the contested request.  That desideratum 
structures one’s act of referral and, thereby, violates a well-formed 
conscience.  Transferring medical records or returning a prescription 
does not, however, so deeply implicate one in the objectionable act.  
One need not thereby intend or deliberate about how to achieve the 
wrong to which one objects.  The objectionable act itself does not 
shape and determine those acts, which incidentally advance its 
achievement.  While such acts make it easier for the patient to satisfy 
his request, they have only a modest determination to that goal.  
Moreover, they are not necessary to insure its success.  For example, if 
prior to the objection, the patient incurred an insurance copayment, 
one would reimburse the same.  It is immaterial to conscientious 
objection that the patient can use that same copayment to procure the 
relevant request elsewhere.  Absent the return of the copayment, or 
return of a prescription, or transfer of medical records, the patient 
could still secure the controverted intervention.37  In any case, con-
scientious objection does not extend to preventing the patient from 
achieving what he seeks.  Rather, it insures that the professional need 
not violate her profession of medicine in her practice.  To transfer a 
medical record, to return a prescription, or to disclose legal options 
that other professionals offer is not, thereby, to violate a well-formed 
 
 37.  In cases of professional objection, and even more widely, the patient enjoys moral, 
and, in some jurisdictions, legal, claims to copayments, prescriptions, and medical records.  For 
example, “Oklahoma explicitly states that a patient has a ‘property right’ in his or her 
prescription . . . .”  JILL MORRISON & GRETCHEN BORCHELT, DON’T TAKE “NO” FOR AN ANSWER: A 
GUIDE TO PHARMACY REFUSAL LAWS, POLICIES AND PRACTICES 8 (2007), http://www.nwlc.org/ 
sites/default/files/pdfs/donttakeno2007.pdf.  See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 354 (West 2010). 
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conscience.  Thus, a professional may not invoke professional con-
scientious objection for such matters. 
Seventh, conscientious objection extends to practitioners and to 
those becoming practitioners.  In terms of her chosen profession, a 
student may object to learning medical interventions she regards as 
incompatible with it.  As yet to be professed and as one still learning 
the relevant profession, the student must ensure that she has a proper 
understanding of her chosen vocation and that her account has 
sufficient bases in reason and in medicine.  She does well to recognize 
the plurality of views concerning what amounts to medical practice.  
Moreover, the aspiring medical professional ought to confirm the 
soundness of her view of medicine and its implications by seeking out 
experienced practitioners and reflecting upon her views in the light of 
their practice. 
Finally, a sensible conscience clause does not take an ad hoc 
approach to objection by singling out specific currently and widely-
recognized controverted interventions such as abortion and physician- 
assisted suicide.38  Rather, it attempts to establish an acknowledged 
forum for the exercise of conscience in a milieu increasingly char-
acterized by dissensus.  In this respect, such a clause would differ 
from the currently existing federal clauses.39  For these current federal 
laws almost exclusively refer to abortion.40 
A number of reasons recommend not so limiting protections of 
conscience to specific interventions.  First, by itself not singling out 
any one controverted matter, the clause treats all parties equally.  All 
recognize that they may have recourse to the exception made for 
conscience, if not now, perhaps at some future date.  It does not require 
 
 38.  For polling data concerning abortion, see Americans Split on Covering Abortion in 
Insurance Plans that Use Federal Subsidies, ANGUS REID PUBLIC OPINION (Jan. 14, 2010), 
http://www.visioncritical.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/2010.01.14_abortion_usa.pdf; 
Lydia Saad, The New Normal on Abortion: Americans More “Pro-Life,” GALLUP (May 14, 2010), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/128036/new-normal-abortion-americans-pro-life.aspx.  For polling 
data concerning physician-assisted suicide, see generally Americans Split over Euthanasia and 
Assisted Suicide, ANGUS REID PUBLIC OPINION (Feb. 10, 2010), http://www.visioncritical.com/ 
wp-content/uploads/2010/02/2010.02.10_euthanasia_usa.pdf; Joseph Carroll, Public Divided over 
Moral Acceptability of Doctor-Assisted Suicide, GALLUP (May 31, 2007), http://www.gallup.com/ 
poll/27727/public-divided-over-moral-acceptability-doctorassisted-suicide.aspx. 
 39.  For the relevant federal protections of conscience, see 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (2006); 
Coats/Snowe Amendment of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 238n (2006); Consolidated Appropriations Act, 
H.R. 2764, 110 Cong. § 508(d) (2008). 
 40.  But see 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(c)(2) (2006) (addressing nondiscrimination in federally-
funded research towards those who perform or refuse to perform “any lawful health service or 
research activity,” including sterilization). 
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an overly active imagination, extensive reading of Antigone, or that 
one become a scholar of Anne Hutchinson’s trial to conjure up con-
ditions in which a majority regards as legitimate some intervention 
one considers abhorrent.41  Consider, for example, the aforementioned 
case from North Carolina of legislatively mandated physician- and 
nurse-participation in administering capital punishment,42 the prospect 
of military physicians being asked to participate in torture, or the 
mundane request that a pediatrician circumcise a healthy infant male 
so that he “fits in” or “looks like Dad.”  In light of such cases, many 
can realize that they have need of and, thereby, can welcome a 
conscientious objection clause.   
Second, by not singling out any debated issue, the conscientious 
objection clause itself avoids unnecessary controversy.  The heat surr-
ounding discussions of conscience derives entirely from that associated 
with abortion.  The important debate concerning abortion ought to be 
entirely distinct from that concerning conscience.  To confuse the two 
equates to thinking that the legitimacy of a Quaker’s recourse to 
conscientious objection depends upon the legitimacy of the specific 
war in which he would otherwise serve.  On the contrary, the reason 
for extending to him a right of objection has nothing at all to do with 
the justice or injustice of any particular war.  Rather, it has to do 
entirely with the relation between the individual and a legitimate 
state.  Enlightened individuals who regard war as legitimate realize 
that the state might demand other acts of them to which they object.  
Thus, they realize that they might have recourse to conscientious 
objection just as the Quaker does.  So also, distinguishing conscientious 
objection in medicine from any one controverted issue allows those 
who regard the profession as something more than a technique for the 
provision of legally permitted acts to see the need for conscientious 
objection.  For the need arises simply from the autonomy of the pro-
 
 41.  See R.C.  JEBB, SOPHOCLES: PLAYS: ANTIGONE (P.E. Easterling ed., Bristol Classical Press 
2004) (1900); WINNIFRED KING RUGG, UNAFRAID: A LIFE  OF ANNE HUTCHINSON 160–70 (1930).  
Or, the converse:  One regards as obligatory something the majority considers heinous.  For the 
purposes of this paper, medical conscientious objection concerns objections to acts one regards 
as violating one’s profession of medicine (not prohibitions concerning medical acts one regards 
as obligatory—a positive obligation to act).  The latter might include the authorities—due to fear 
of losing a practitioner in low supply during a plague—forbidding a physician from treating a 
patient suffering from a highly contagious potentially lethal disease.  Such cases are not the 
concern of this paper, nor do they typify actual cases of medical conscientious objection.  They 
do, however, belong to the topic; a complete treatment would address them.  I am inclined to 
think that the lineaments of conscientious objection concerning positive obligations differ from 
those regarding refraining from acting. 
 42. See N.C. Dep’t of Corr. v. N.C. Med. Bd., 657 S.E.2d 641, 645–47 (N.C. 2009). 
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fession from the political and social fora in which it operates.  Third, 
by not limiting the clause to any one intervention, one makes room 
for responses to unforeseen developments43 and less widely yet still 
controverted matters.44   
Fourth, and finally, all of the above aspects of a general conscience 
clause strengthen the inherent fairness of such a clause and, thereby, 
the political case to be made for it.  For people can see that while they 
may enjoy liberty in their invocation of conscience, they may also 
incur costs when others with whom they differ invoke conscience in 
refusing an intervention they request.  So, for example, those who 
oppose abortion may realize that a non-specific conscience clause, 
which does not require them to perform or refer for abortion, will also 
enable physicians who regard futile care to object to its provision.  
Moreover, once legislated, it will be less likely to suffer the constant 
tug of war fought over intervention-specific clauses.  It will come to 
be seen, as it ought to be, as part of the nature of medicine as an 
autonomous profession with its own ethics. 
III. THE DUTIES OF THE CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR 
The above represent the outlines of a sensible clause that respects 
claims to conscientious objection.  Associated with rights are obliga-
tions.  What duties accompany conscientious objection?  To sum up 
what follows:  The obligations to the patient remain unchanged, but 
for the denial of the contested request. 
Specifically, what do these obligations entail?  First, following 
from the very meaning of professing—and to develop a point pre-
viously mooted—full disclosure imposes the obligation to promulgate 
to the relevant parties one’s conscientious objection.  This includes 
one’s prospective and current patients, colleagues, employers, and 
relevant institutions, for example hospitals and insurance companies.  
With respect to patients, this bears on informed consent and patient 
autonomy.  Considering the recent referendum legalizing physician-
assisted suicide in the State of Washington,45 absent an internist’s 
 
 43.  For example, new technologies. 
 44.  For example, routine infant male circumcision or the provision of what one regards as 
futile interventions. 
 45.  See Washington Death with Dignity Act, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.245.010–
70.245.904 (West 2009); Jacob Goldstein, Washington Passes Initiative 1000, Legalizing Physician-
Assisted Suicide, WALL ST. J. HEALTH BLOG (Nov. 5, 2008 8:46 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/ 
health/2008/11/05/washington-passes-initiative-1000-legalizing-physician-assisted-suicide. 
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noting his objection to the procedure, a current or prospective patient 
might mistakenly assume that her doctor would agree to her request 
for physician-assisted suicide at some future date.  Were he to inform 
her of his objection to doing so, she would have the opportunity to 
make alternative arrangements, perhaps developing a physician-
patient relationship with a doctor whose views are more consonant 
with hers.  Moreover, by promulgating one’s conscientious objector 
status, one avoids the previously noted problem of a moral di-
lemma resulting from a patient’s reasonable reliance, which would 
require referral. 
Second, conscientious objector status obliges the relevant pro-
fessional to explain her reasons for her objection to those patients who 
request further information.  That is, conscientious objection itself 
involves its own version of full disclosure based upon a patient’s 
informed consent.  This does not mean that the patient must consent 
to the practitioner’s objection.  Rather, it means that the patient is due 
the offer of an explanation.  This does not, however, amount to the 
professional’s having a right to pontificate concerning the relevant 
matter.  Rather, the interested patient ought to receive some answer to 
the question as to why the professional objects.  Certainly, not all 
patients will be interested to know why.  Those who are not interested 
ought not to be treated as captive audiences; those who do want to 
know ought to receive a considerate and considered answer.  In 
discussion of one’s conscientious objection, full disclosure requires 
that one note the controverted nature of the matter concerning which 
one objects.  One must bring to the patient’s attention that not all 
medical professionals agree with one’s own view.  As noted, if no 
previous relationship exists, this does not require referral.  It does, 
however, require that one puts one’s own account of medicine into 
the larger context that includes other, disagreeing professionals, in 
virtue of which disagreement one resorts to conscientious objection.  
The patient ought to emerge having a sense both of one’s grounds for 
objecting and of the pluralism found in medicine regarding the 
controverted matter.  This constitutes the analogue of informed consent 
for non-controverted medical care.  A professional would have failed in 
this respect were a patient to emerge from the interaction thinking that 
the medical profession as a whole rejected the requested intervention.46 
 
 46.  If a patient does not wish to discuss the professional’s conscientious objection, the 
professional still must attempt to insure that the patient leaves the clinical encounter realizing 
the legality of the requested intervention and that other professionals might not object to it. 
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Third, conscientious objector status bears exclusively on the 
patient’s contested request; it does not relate to the other care the 
physician, nurse, or pharmacist provides for the patient.  If a relation-
ship exists with the patient, then the obligation of non-abandonment 
mandates that prior to alternative arrangements being in place for the 
controverted intervention, the physician, nurse, or pharmacist must 
provide care to which she does not object.  So, for example, the 
internist who objects to her terminally ill patient’s considered request 
for physician-assisted suicide does not thereby abdicate her respons-
ibility to care for that patient otherwise until the patient finds an 
alternative physician. 
Fourth, conscientious objector status requires the continued 
maintenance of confidentiality, particularly with respect to the fact 
that the professional objects to something the patient requests.  For 
example, a woman who requests emergency contraception at the 
counter of an objecting pharmacist does not thereby forfeit any of her 
claims regarding discretion and confidentiality concerning that very 
communication with the pharmacist.  Indeed, because such situations 
are fraught with potential for embarrassment and the untoward 
interest of others, the professional must strenuously and scrupulously 
protect the patient’s privacy specifically concerning the patient’s 
request and the practitioner’s conscientious objection. 
Finally, as earlier noted, while conscientious objection does not 
require referral to a third party who will abide by the patient’s request, 
it does require transfer of relevant documents, returning a pre-
scription, and, more generally, acts which, while they may result in 
the act to which one objects, do not require one to aim at that act. 
Professional conscientious objection finds its basis in medical 
practitioners’ ancient practice of publicly expressing their accounts of 
health, sickness, caring, and curing for which they stand.  A sensible 
conscience clause recognizes both the privileges and responsibilities 
attending such a profession. 
 
